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When More is Less—SWAT and Procedural
Justice
Timothy C. MacDonnell ∗
Abstract
Since the “war on drugs” began in the early 1970s the use of
Special Weapons and Tactics units has increased exponentially.
These units, originally designed to address unique policing
situations like riots or a barricaded gun man, are now
deploying approximately 60,000 times a year. Over half of those
deployments are for search warrants. Because SWAT units deploy
assuming that they are going to a situation with a high likelihood
of violence, their tactics reflect that assumption. SWAT means and
methods emphasize the decisive use of force to resolve conflicts.
These means and methods do not encourage communication
between police and citizens, only compliance. At the same time that
SWAT units were becoming more common, two professors
published the highly influential book Procedural Justice. In that
book the authors sought to understand how procedure in the
resolution of legal disputes connected to justice. Since then,
scholars, most notably Professor Tom Tyler, have empirically
examined the connection between procedure and individual
perceptions of justice. Much of that research has noted a powerful
connection between an individual’s perception of justice and
whether they believed they “have had their say” in the resolution of
a dispute. This research has also asserted connections between
procedural justice and the public’s perceptions of police legitimacy
and the further connection between police legitimacy and law
abiding behavior. Despite the growing recognition that police
legitimacy and procedural justice walk hand in hand, the growth
of SWAT has continued. This article examines the rise of SWAT and
∗ Clinical Professor of Law; Director, Advanced Administrative Litigation
Clinic (Black Lung), Washington and Lee University School of Law.
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procedural justice, and discusses how the overuse of SWAT units is
harmful to procedural justice and the public’s perception of police
legitimacy. Finally, the article suggests that use of SWAT assets
during the execution of a search warrant should be at the discretion
of judges rather than police. Additionally, the article suggests that
command and control over SWAT units should be centralized at the
state and federal levels to ensure proper use and training.
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I. Introduction
At 6 a.m. on January 5, 2014, police officers, clad in body
armor and black uniforms, allegedly broke down the door to the
apartment rented by Tabatha Werkmeister and Grinage Dion
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Wilson in Pittsburgh Pennsylvania. 1 Next, the officers deployed a
smoke grenade and quickly detained all the residents in the home. 2
Those residents included Ms. Werkmeister, Mr. Wilson, and their
four children, ages two through nine. 3 The family was taken from
their home barefoot in their nightclothes and placed in an
unheated police van where an officer stood guard with an assault
style rifle. 4 The temperature outside was approximately 20 degrees
Fahrenheit. 5 After police searched for around 25 minutes the
family was led back into their home, given a card to apply for
reimbursement for the broken door, and told that they should have
their apartment number affixed to their front door. 6 In other
words, the police got the wrong house.
In an interview after the incident, Ms. Werkmeister stated she
did not understand what was going on when the police broke down
her door or why the police were in her home. 7 In the lawsuit that
has been filed, Ms. Werkmeister and her boyfriend, Mr. Wilson,
allege that police offered no explanation for the detention or search
or an apology. 8 The lawsuit further alleges that the couple’s
children are now frightened of police to such a degree that they will
not spend time with their grandmother, a lieutenant in the
Pittsburgh police, if she is wearing her uniform. 9
The manner in which police entered the Werkmeister/Wilson
home is called a “dynamic entry” and is a technique commonly used
by the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Community to secure

1. See City of Pittsburg Named in Lawsuit Stemming from Armed Raid of
Family’s Home, WPXI (Aug. 13, 2015, 10:30 AM), www.wpxi.com/news/local/citypittsburgh-named-lawsuit-temming-armed-raid-/32186989 (discussing a civil
complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, Case 2:15-cv-01069-MRH, filed August 13, 2015) (on file with
author). A spokesperson for the police claimed the Werkmeister/Wilson family
was removed from the apartment for safety reasons. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Complaint in Civil Action at 1, Werkmeister v. City of Pittsburgh, No.
2:15cv1069 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2015).
9. Id. at 7.
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a location. 10 When using this technique officers employ surprise,
speed, and overwhelming force to secure the target. 11 The term
used by some SWAT literature is to “dominate” a target. 12 To
achieve this result SWAT teams will usually enter a structure via
two “breach” locations or points of entry. 13 When “breaching,” tools
like battering rams and modified crowbars are often used. 14 Next,
a diversionary device is commonly employed—these include smoke
and “flash-bang” grenades. 15 To ensure adequate force, some
SWAT units assign two officers to each “problem.” 16 Problems
include rooms and people. 17 Thus, overwhelming force is used to
converge at a decisive point while maximizing speed and surprise
to the advantage of the SWAT team. 18
These techniques all appear to be appropriate when SWAT
teams are facing a hostage situation or barricaded gunman, but in
10. See Karena Rahall, The Green Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the
Police Industrial Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1817 (2015) (“’Dynamic
entry’ raids have become an integral part of SWAT tactics, even when police have
no information to conclude that officers might be in danger.”).
11. Glenn French, Dynamic Entry Versus Deliberate Entry, POLICEONE.COM
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.policeone.com/SWAT/articles/ 2154851-Dynamicentry-versus-deliberate-entry/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
12. Moore v. Weekly, 159 F. Supp. 3d 784, 790–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); see also
French, supra note 11 (stating that the standard across the country for dynamic
entries is to “use . . . an overwhelming amount of dominating force.”).
13. See Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing a
common dynamic entry where a SWAT team threw stun grenades into a rear
window and threw another into the front door followed by breaching the door
(citing Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations
Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
673, 682–83 (2001)); see also BURLINGTON POLICE DEP’T, AFTER ACTION TRAINING
REPORT
16
(2012),
acluofnorthcarolina.org/
files/militarization%20docs/Burlington%20PD%20(11).pdf (“plan to breach two
entry points.”).
14. See, e.g., BURLINGTON POLICE DEP’T, supra note 13, at 9 (providing
examples of how SWAT breaches a structure).
15. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1812 n.197 (“Flash-Bangs are used by
special units during hostage rescue and high-risk warrants.”).
16. See French, supra note 11 (discussing that usually two operators enter a
room together, sometimes three or more depending upon the size of the room).
17. See id. (emphasizing that the goal is to go room to room, clearing “areas
of responsibilities.”).
18. See id. (explaining the use of overwhelming force with critical speed to
the point “you can effectively engage your adversary” in order to surprise them,
giving you an “opportunity to neutralize your threat before he engages you.”).
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the vast majority of cases where SWAT teams are used they are
not facing such formidable opposition. Of the approximately 60,000
SWAT deployments a year, 19 over half are to execute drug search
warrants, usually in homes. 20
The experience described by individuals who have been
present during a dynamic entry often includes words like
frightening or terrifying. 21 These emotional responses are by
design. 22 As mentioned above, the dynamic entry technique is
meant to dominate a target by being frightening and disorienting,
thereby preventing individuals from mounting a coherent forceful
response. 23 But with SWAT teams being deployed as much as
60,000 times in a year, 24 with approximately 62% of those

19. Ilya Shapiro & Randal John Meyer, When the SWAT Team Calls, the
Constitution Goes Out the Window, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 18, 2015, 11:03 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/when-swat-team-calls-constitution-goes-outwindow-373663 (on file with author). But see Peter B. Kraska, Militarization
and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Policing, 1 POLICING 501, 506 (Dec.
13,
2007),
http://cjmasters.eku.edu/sites/cjmasters.eku.edu/files/21stmilitari
zation.pdf (estimating the rate of SWAT deployments to be at 45,000 in 2006); see
also Radley Balko, Shedding Light on the Use of SWAT Teams, WASH. POST (Feb.
17,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/
02/17/shedding-light-on-the-use-of-swat-teams/?utm_term=.3537d973d24d (“The
criminologist Peter Kraska has estimated that there are somewhere between
50,000 and 80,000 SWAT raids per year now in America, and that number is
likely growing”) (on file with author).
20. See Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19 (“Today. . . extreme situations
account for only a small fraction of SWAT deployments; they’re used primarily to
serve low-level drug-search warrants.”); Radley Balko, New ACLU Report Takes
a Snapshot of Police Militarization in the United States, WASH. POST (June 24,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/06/24/newaclu-report-takes-a-snapshot-of-police-militarization-in-the-unitedstates/?utm_term=.eec64d715fc5) (noting over half of SWAT actions were in
private homes) (on file with author).
21. See Astead W. Herndon, Residents Rip Police After Lengthy SWAT
Standoff, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro
/2016/10/16/revere-standoff-with-swat-team-endspeacefully/UgaCM7RXNCeradQSlNgS4M/story.html (describing the fear the
family felt after being recipients of a SWAT raid) (on file with author).
22. See Rahall, supra note 10 (discussing that raids are terrifying); see also
French, supra note 11 (describing that when SWAT members tactfully enter
rooms, it is for the purpose of disorienting and confusing adversaries).
23. French, supra note 11.
24. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19; see Balko, supra note 19 (saying that
SWAT raids are somewhere between 50,000 and 80,000 per year).
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deployments being used to execute drug search warrants, 25 what
else is being achieved in a dynamic entry? What impact does this
SWAT technique and other SWAT methods have on the public’s
perception of police legitimacy? Further, why, in the absence of
some express authority from a court, should police be permitted to
use such techniques? These questions are the focus of this Article.
Section Two of this Article focuses on the impact of police
military-style tactics and equipment on public perception of police
legitimacy. 26 The expectation that professional police forces should
be distinct from the military is embedded in Anglo-American law
and the policing traditions of England and the United States. 27 A
number of important differences support this bright line, but
recent scholarship regarding the public’s perception of fairness,
justice, and why individuals “obey the law,” provides even more
compelling justification for a bright line distinction between
military and police. Beginning in the mid-1970s with the
influential book Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 28 and
continuing today with the scholarship of Professor Tom Tyler, 29 an
argument has been made that the impact of procedural justice on
the public’s acceptance of police authority, and the rule of law in
general, is powerful. 30 This section will examine the creation and
25. Id. But see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 2 (2014), [hereinafter ACLU, WAR COMES
HOME]
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf (saying that 62% of SWAT deployments were for
drug search warrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
26. See infra Section II (“Procedural Justice and the Language and
Equipment of War.”).
27. See Principles of Good Policing, CIVITAS, http://civitas.org.uk/research/
crime/facts-comments/principles-of-good-policing/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016)
(listing Sir Robert Peel’s “Nine Principles of Policing,” which, along with the
passage of the “Bill for Improving the Police in and near the Metropolis” in 1829,
were influential in modernizing the urban police force).
28. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
29. See generally E.A. LIND & T.R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); T.R. TYLER & S. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000); T.R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE (2011).
30. See infra Section II.A (“Procedural Justice”) (discussing how procedural
justice is critically linked to the public’s acceptance of aspects of police, such as
their legitimacy and authority).
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rise of SWAT, and how SWAT means and methods impact the core
elements of procedural justice. 31
Section Three of this Article discusses the current rules that
govern SWAT execution of search warrants. 32 SWAT units possess
no greater authority than any other police units and are thus
subject to the same limitations. Although the manner in which a
search warrant is executed is usually left to police that does not
mean police discretion is unfettered. 33 The Fourth Amendment
governs the manner in which search warrants are executed and
the United States Supreme Court has provided guidance on the
subject. 34 Although there are no Supreme Court cases that
explicitly state SWAT operations are subject to the same
limitations as any other police activity, there are no cases where
the Court has suggested that SWAT operates under different
rules. 35
Section Four discusses measures designed to ensure that
when SWAT forces are deployed there are adequate justifications
for their use and for the particular tactics they employ. 36 Terrorist
attacks, hostage situations, and criminals equipped with weapons
that can outmatch standard police issue are all threats that
support the need for some type of SWAT capability. 37 Who
determines under what circumstances a SWAT deployment occurs
31. Infra Section II.B (“SWAT”).
32. Infra Section III (“Fourth Amendment and SWAT”).
33. See L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (executing a search
warrant, an officer “may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to
ensure their own safety.”); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (“It
is incumbent on the officer executing a search warrant to ensure the search is
lawfully authorized and lawfully conducted.”); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S.
31 (2003) (saying that police have the ability to execute warrants without
knocking first when they garner reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances);
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (“[T]he manner in which a warrant is
executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness.”).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Outfitting
sheriff's deputies in hooded combat fatigues, arming them with laser-sighted
weapons and ordering them to conduct the ‘dynamic entry’ of a private home does
not exempt their conduct from Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonableness.”).
36. Infra Section IV (“Solutions”).
37. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1818 (saying that the “original purpose of
SWAT was to respond to active shooter, barricaded suspects, and hostage
situations.”).
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and what techniques are authorized, however, is variable. 38 In
some jurisdictions, it is a police decision. 39 Some states have passed
statutes that require police to seek authorization to execute a “no
knock” search warrant. 40 I will suggest a system that limits SWAT
use for executing warrants (arrest and search) to circumstances
where a magistrate finds articulable facts that support the
deployment of SWAT and the specific techniques to be applied. 41
Further, in circumstances where police could have secured a
warrant prior to taking action that authorized SWAT means and
methods but did not, claims of exigent circumstances should be
looked at more closely. 42 Additionally, I will suggest that the many
disparate SWAT units fall under centralized state and federal
chains of command. 43 It is essential to effective SWAT operations
that SWAT officers are highly trained and used only when
necessary. Most police departments with SWAT units do not have
the resources to permit their SWAT officers to be dedicated
exclusively to conducting SWAT training and operations. 44 Thus,
most SWAT officers are, in effect, part time SWAT—with their
duties being divided between other policing responsibilities and
SWAT. 45 By centralizing and consolidating SWAT resources at the

38. See Ian Evans, Who Watches the Stormtroopers? Judicial Oversight as a
Remedy for Excessive Deployment of Battlefield Technology in Search Warrant
Execution, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 109, 128 (2016) (promoting the
requirement that SWAT deployment be through magistrate approval).
39. See Holland, 268 F.3d at 1183 (discussing a case in Colorado in which a
search warrant was obtained but the Sheriff decided to use a SWAT team); Smith
v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the police in
Pennsylvania instigated the SWAT involvement).
40. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210 (LexisNexis 2016) (exemplifying
state statutes prohibiting no-knock forced entries without a warrant unless
certain specified exigencies exist).
41. Infra Section IV.A. (“Judicial Approval of SWAT Deployments”).
42. Id.
43. Infra Section IV.B.. (“Centralizing Control over SWAT”).
44. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE & NAT’L TACTICAL OFFICERS ASS’N,
NATIONAL SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) STUDY: A NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL TRENDS AND ISSUES FROM 2009 TO 2013 8 (2013),
[hereinafter SWAT STUDY] https://ntoa.org/ntoa-swat-study (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
45. See id. at 9 (discussing that 89.9% of agencies have SWAT members on
a part-time basis).
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state and federal levels, SWAT units will have the opportunity to
train fully for the mission that SWAT is best suited to.
II. Procedural Justice and the Language and Equipment of War
Two seemingly contradictory movements began or gained
momentum in the 1970s and have continued to today. The first
movement was the creation and proliferation of SWAT units. As
early as 1967 a formal SWAT unit was part of the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) 46 and since then the number of SWAT
units nationwide have increased exponentially. 47 The second
movement was pioneered by a social psychologist and a law
professor who co-authored the influential book Procedural Justice:
A Psychological Analysis in 1975. 48 The book examined the critical
societal questions of what procedures are used by individuals and
groups to resolve conflicts and why. 49 From this work has come
research that has asked why individuals and groups follow the
law. 50 Several studies have suggested that procedural justice plays
an important role in an individual’s willingness to follow the law. 51
Central to whether individuals believe procedural justice exists is
the degree to which they believe a process is fair, neutral, and
permits them a voice in the resolution of the conflict. 52 This theory
46. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1789 (“The first SWAT unit was formed in
1967 by Los Angeles Police Inspector Daryl Gates . . . .”).
47. See id. (“Between 1980 and 2000, there was a 1400% increase in SWAT
deployments.”). But see The Rise of SWAT Teams, PBS: INDEP. LENS,
http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/videos/the-rise-of-swat-teams/ (last visited
Nov. 21, 2016) (saying that SWAT has increased 15,000% from the late 1970s to
today) (on file with author).
48. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
49. Id. at 1.
50. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990) (introducing the
various perspectives on reasons why people choose to obey the law).
51. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 29, at 3 (looking at “justice judgments
based on norms of social process.”); TYLER & BLADER, supra note 29, at 142
(“[M]embers react strongly to the message about quality of treatment that is
contained within formal rules and procedures, there would seem to be much for
groups to gain by developing the type of statements of rights and entitlements
that characterize the law.”); TYLER, supra note 50, at 12 (“[S]eeking to understand
the factors shaping cooperation with law and legal authorities.”).
52. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 128 (discussing in depth the three factors
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of why individuals follow the law has been one of the arguments
favoring the movement to community policing. 53 The focus of this
section is on explaining the core components of procedural justice,
the rise of SWAT, some common equipment and tactics of SWAT
units, and the impact of SWAT means and methods on procedural
justice. 54
A. Procedural Justice
The term procedural justice is a relatively new expression. It
was popularized in the 1970s in the work of two professors entitled
Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. 55 In it, Professor
Thibaut and Professor Walker examined the methods and
procedures that are used to resolve conflicts between individuals
and groups. 56 They arrived at the conclusion that “the main finding
of the body of our research, . . . [is] that for litigation the class of
procedures commonly called ‘adversarial’ is clearly superior.” 57 The
author’s theorized that at least part of why individuals favored the
adversarial process was the high degree of control individuals had
in the process. 58
The work of Professors Thibaut and Walker has been
expanded and further developed by a number of researchers, but
of particular note is Law Professor Tom Tyler. Professor Tyler has
authored and co-authored several books and articles on different
affecting whether individuals believe procedural justice exists).
53. See Rachel Martin, Procedural Justice: Taking The Ego Out of Policing,
NPR (June 7, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/06/07/412633564/proceduraljustice-taking-the-ego-out-of-policing (describing Oakland, California’s efforts to
build trust between police and the community) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM,
LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A NEW ELEMENT OF POLICE LEADERSHIP, 1
(Craig Fischer ed. 2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_
Online_Documents/Leadership/legitimacy%20and%20procedural%20justice%20%20a%20new%20element%20of%20police%20leadership.pdf (reporting that
individuals view police with more legitimacy in a system of community policing).
54. Infra Section II.A (“Procedural Justice”).
55. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 48, at 13–14, 117–24 (looking at
fairness and control).
56. See id. at 72–77 (noting adversarial and inquisitorial procedures).
57. Id. at 118.
58. Id. at 119.
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aspects of procedural justice. 59 In his book Why People Obey the
Law, Professor Tyler focuses particularly on the connections
between procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance. 60 Through
empirical research, Professor Tyler asserts a connection between
individuals’ sense of whether police were providing procedural
justice and whether they believed the police authority was
legitimate. 61 This question is not merely a matter of whether the
public thinks favorably about the police. Professor Tyler asserts
that those who felt police were not legitimate were less likely to
comply with police direction or aid police in general. 62 Thus, where
there is a sense of procedural justice, there is more compliance with
the law and compliance with law officers.
The work of Professor Tyler and others also revealed factors
that were linked to whether individuals felt they had received
procedural justice. 63 Significant to a sense of procedural justice,
found in both Professor Tyler and Professors Thibaut and Walker’s
work, was the degree of control individuals were able to bring to
bear on the situation. 64 Professor Tyler found that control over
process was an important factor in determining whether
individuals felt they had received procedural justice—and a
powerful factor in whether an individual felt they had process
control was whether individuals felt that what they were saying
had been considered in resolving a situation. 65 Other factors that
were considered and found to have an influence on an individual’s
sense of procedural justice were: whether their experiences with
police were consistent; whether the officials were impartial; was
the decision of the official accurate or of high quality; was there an
agency or official individuals could complain to; was the official
polite and concerned with the citizen’s rights; and did the official
59. See generally sources cited supra note 29; TYLER, supra note 50
(introducing the various perspectives on reasons why people choose to obey the
law).
60. TYLER, supra note 50, at 106.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 31, 33, 58, 108.
63. Id. at 125–57.
64. See id. at 134 (“[T]he distribution of control when a person is dealing with
legal authority influences the person’s assessment of whether procedural justice
has occurred.”).
65. Id. at 130.

146

23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 135 (2016)

seek to be fair. 66 Thus, procedural justice is, as Professor Tyler
wrote, “complex and multifaceted.” 67
Some of the factors affecting procedural justice are out of the
hands of police—for example, an individual’s sense of consistency,
which builds off of past knowledge and experience, is out of police
hands. 68 Also, whether there is “correctability,” which asks
whether there is an agency or individual a citizen can complain to
and whether such a complaint will matter, is not controlled by
police on the scene. 69 However, most factors are within the control
of officer. 70 If an officer is polite, seeks to get all the information
necessary to making a good decision, gives an individual the
opportunity to have her say and have her say matter, this
positively impacts a sense of procedural justice. 71
The importance of procedural justice is even more potentially
striking when several other aspects are considered. First, as
mentioned above, procedural justice is linked to legitimacy. 72
Legitimacy is arguably linked to whether individuals feel
personally committed to following the directions of police or
assisting police. 73 Thus, procedural justice is potentially critical to
law enforcement. Second, an individual’s sense of whether she or
her friends and family received procedural justice are powerful
factors—more important than race—in determining legitimacy. 74
66. Id. at 128–30, 135–37.
67. Id. at 137.
68. See id. at 10 (“[E]very day experiences with the police . . . influence
citizens.”).
69. Id. at 136.
70. See id. at 154 (discussing that the officer can control his behavior, his
apparent honesty, and overall ethicality of his actions).
71. See id. (discussing that, citizens, when they “lack the information needed
to rely on consistency,” they rely on information directly in front of them—the
police officer).
72. See id. at 31 (“[T]hose who view authority as legitimate are more likely
to comply with legal authority.”).
73. See id. (“[T]hose who view authority as legitimate are more likely to
comply with legal authority.”); Id. at 56 (discussing that obedience to the law is
“strongly linked to people’s morality” and that there is a “general feeling” that
“law breaking is morally wrong.”).
74. Id. at 90, 63, 227; see also Jake Horowitz, Making Every Encounter
Count: Building Trust and Confidence in the Police, 256 NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 8
(2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000256c.pdf.
NIJ recently funded five studies exploring factors that influence satisfaction
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So attitudes are not set and police have the opportunity to shape
the public’s perception of them in every interaction they have with
the public.
B. SWAT
The rise of SWAT units in the United States has been well
documented by numerous sources, but few as comprehensively as
author Radley Balko in Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization
of America’s Police Forces. 75 Balko discusses the historic resistance
to the use of the military for policing and the dangers that arise
when the military is used for domestic policing. 76 He also discusses
the seemingly contradictory willingness to permit the police to
become more militarized. 77 Balko explains how the vision of SWAT
came together starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 78
The belief that police needed an enhanced quasi-military
capability can be traced to a number of events in the 1960s, but
two incidents—the Watts Riots and the University of Texas bell
tower shooting—are particularly illustrative. 79

Id.

with the police. The research suggests that satisfaction is shaped by
demographic variables, neighborhood crime conditions, and experiences
with the police—whether first hand or indirect. Race was not found to
directly determine level of satisfaction. Instead, researchers concluded that
race, due to its correlation with other demographic variables, neighborhood
crime rates, and experiences with police, was an indirect influence on the
level of satisfaction with the police.

75. See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013) (tracing the growth of the American police force
with an emphasis on the period from 1960 to the 2000s); see also generally PETER
B. KRASKA, MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING
ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE, 1–13 (2001).
76. BALKO, supra note 75, at 11–26, 35–40.
77. Id. at 43–80.
78. Id. at 43–137.
79. See DAVID A. KLINGER & JEFF ROJEK, A MULTI-METHOD STUDY OF SPECIAL
WEAPONS & TACTICS TEAMS 1 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/223855.pdf (explaining how these events demonstrated the ineffectiveness
of local police forces, which led to further development of SWAT forces in the
1960s).
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In the summer of 1965, the county of Watts, a part of the Los
Angeles metropolitan area, exploded in six days of rioting. 80 The
riots caused thirty-four deaths, over one thousand injuries, more
than three thousand arrests, and approximately forty million
dollars of property damage. 81 It also exposed deep anger among
members of the African American community in the county of
Watts and the police’s inability to maintain law and order when
faced with a large scale riot. 82
In 1966 Charles Whitman killed eleven people and wounded
over thirty others by firing a number of hunting rifles from the top
of a bell tower in Austin, Texas. 83 After killing his mother and wife,
Whitman barricaded himself in the bell tower on the campus of the
University of Texas. 84 The tower was approximately 230 feet
high. 85 When Austin police attempted to return fire on Whitman,
their weapons did not have the range to hit him. 86
These two events illustrated two common arguments for
SWAT units. First, there are some circumstances involving
widespread civil unrest which normal police units are incapable of
effectively responding. 87 Second, there are occasions where
criminals will be more heavily armed than the average officer. 88
The Watts Riot was only one of several in the 1960s. 89 Riots in
Detroit, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey, also caused
numerous deaths and millions of dollars in property damage. 90 In
80. Watts Riots, NPR, http://www.pbs.org/hueypnewton/times/times_watts.
html (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
81. Id.
82. BALKO, supra note 75, at 51–53.
83. Id. at 56–58.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See KLINGER & ROJEK, supra note 79 (describing that certain violent
episodes can “easily outstrip the capacity” of normal law enforcement officers).
88. See id. (applying the same line of reasoning for weapons as well).
89. Urban Decay in the 1960’s, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/johngardner/
chapters/5b.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Urban Decay] (on file
with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
90. See Virginia Postrel, The Consequences of the 1960’s Race Riots Come
into View, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/30/
business/the-consequences-of-the-1960s-race-riots-come-into-view.html?_r=0
(last updated Jan. 3, 2005) (saying that in Detroit alone there was about $50
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Watts, Detroit, and Newark, National Guard troops had to be
called to put an end to the riots. 91 In 1967–68 police forces in
California, Florida, and New Jersey took steps toward a more
militarized police force. 92
What started with a few major metropolitan police forces in
the late 1960s has now evolved into virtually every major police
force (those serving over 50,000 residents) having its own SWAT. 93
Many other smaller police forces also have their own SWAT
units. 94 Additionally, federal agencies, some not even involved in
law enforcement—like the Department of Agriculture, or the
Tennessee Valley Authority—have been alleged to have SWATlike units. 95
million in property damage) (on file with author); Newark Riot (1967),
BLACKPAST.ORG, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/newark-riot-1967 (last visited
Nov. 21, 2016) (“Property damage exceeded $10 million”) (on file with author); see
also Glenn C. Frese, The Riot Curfew, 57 CAL. L. REV. 450, 450 (1969) (analyzing
the constitutionality of riot curfews).
91. See BALKO, supra note 75, at 42 (“By the 1960s, the civil rights,
counterculture, and antiwar movements would be in full swing, leading the
government to call repeatedly on the National Guard and occasionally on US
troops to keep order in urban areas.”).
92. Id. at 62.
93. See Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law
Enforcement: Hearing on D927 Before the Subcomm. On Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 1–8 (2014) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony
of Peter Kraska, Professor, School of Justice Studies, University of Eastern
Kentucky) http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/oversight-of-federal-programsfor-equipping-state-and-local-law-enforcement (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
As of the late 1990s, 89 percent of American police departments serving
populations of fifty thousand people or more had a PPU, almost double
of what existed in the mid-1980s. Their growth in smaller jurisdictions
(agencies serving between 25 and 50,000 people) was even more
pronounced. Currently, about 80 percent of small town agencies have
a PPU; in the mid-1980s only 20 percent had them.
Id.
94. Id.
95. See John Fund, The United States of SWAT?, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 14, 2014,
4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/376053/united-states-swatjohn-fund (“Dozens of federal agencies now have Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) teams to further an expanding definition of their missions . . . the
Department of Agriculture, the Railroad Retirement Board . . . . [all] of these
have their own SWAT units and are part of a worrying trend towards the
militarization of federal agencies . . . .”) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). But see Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Rand Paul’s
Grand, Inaccurate Retelling of ‘Federal SWAT Team” Raids, WASH. POST (Sept. 1,
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Most researchers who have studied the rise of SWAT units
have connected their proliferation with the war on drugs. 96 At
roughly the same time as many major cities were considering
SWAT units, 97 Richard Nixon was ramping up his anti-drug
initiative. 98 In June 1971, President Nixon addressed Congress
about the drug problem in the United States, asking for
substantial funding to fight the threat posed by illegal drugs. 99 In
his address, President Nixon famously declared that drugs were
“public enemy number one” and “in order to fight and defeat this
enemy it is necessary to wage a new all-out offense.” 100 Nixon went
further, and as part of that offense the Drug Enforcement Agency

2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/ 2015/09/01/randpauls-grand-inaccurate-retelling-of-federal-swat-team-raids/ (discussing that
Steve Lenkart, Executive Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers
Association, said that the only federal agency that has an actual SWAT team is
the FBI) (on file with author).
96. See Hearing, supra note 93 (detailing the correlation between the war on
drugs and the quasi-militarization of police forces); KRASKA supra note 75, at 7
(same); BALKO, supra note 75, at 125 (same); Cadman Robb Kiker III, From
Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization of American Policing Equipment,
Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 282, 286–87 (2015) (“The
number of specialty police units—and the frequency of their use—expanded in
the 1980s to meet the needs of the war on drugs. Today, seventy-nine percent of
SWAT team deployments are used for execution of a warrant, most commonly in
drug investigations.”); Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing
American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC.
PROBS. 1, 9 (1997) (discussing how the war on drugs has been transformed into
“tangible militarized action” and an increase in police paramilitary units). See
generally David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers be Peace Officers?
The Waco Disaster and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30
AKRON L. REV. 619, 651–53 (1997).
97. See Richard Fairburn, Police Militarization and the Evolution of SWAT:
Requiring a Minimum Police Population of 100 Officers to Establish a SWAT
Team Helps to Keep Standards High and Overuse Low, POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 13,
2013),
https://www.policeone.com/swat/articles/6384874-Police-militarizationand-the-evolution-of-SWAT/ (noting that in the 1970s only major cities could elect
to have SWAT units) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
98. BALKO, supra note 75, at 125.
99. See Richard Nixon, Former U.S. President, Address to Congress (June
17, 1971), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048 (addressing the issue of
increasing incidents of death caused by narcotics and declaring a war on drugs)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
100. Id.
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was created in 1973. 101 The war continued after President Nixon’s
resignation. 102
Over the course of the next forty plus years, the growth of
SWAT could be described as a tale of incentive and consequence.
Money was funneled to both federal and state law enforcement
agencies to support the war on drugs. 103 More and more of that
money was used to fund SWAT teams and to use them in anti-drug
actions. 104 Laws were passed that permitted local law enforcement
and state governments to receive funding through drug civil
forfeiture actions. 105 Finally, after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
a new funding source was created for SWAT units through the
Department of Homeland Security. 106 By 2010, the Department of
Homeland Security—an organization that only came into existence

101. See DEA History, DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, https://www.dea.gov/
about/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (outlining the history of the Drug
Enforcement Agency and explaining Nixon’s establishment of the DEA through a
July 1973 Executive Order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
102. See id. (“Today, the DEA has nearly 5,000 special agents and a budget of
$2.03 billion.”).
103. See Radley Balko, How did America’s Police Become a Military Force on
J.
(July
1,
2013,
10:10
AM),
the
Streets,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/how_did_americas_police_become_a_military_force_on_the_streets
(noting how the Byrne Formula Grant Program provided greater money for drug
related law enforcement activity) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
104. See id. (noting the disparity in funding between other units, such as the
sex crime unit, and SWAT and drug units, with one officer stating, “‘the SWAT
team, the drug guys, they always [have] money.’”).
105. See Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Steven Rich, D.C. Police Plan for Future
Seizure Proceeds Years in Advance in City Budget Documents, WASH. POST (Nov.
15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/dc-police-plan-forfuture-seizure-proceeds-years-in-advance-in-city-budgetdocuments/2014/11/15/7025edd2-6b76-11e4-b053-65cea7903f2e_story.html
(explaining the plans D.C. police made in anticipation of “proceeds from future
civil seizures of cash and property” resulting from drug seizures) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also DEP’T OF
JUST. GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE & LOCAL L. ENF’T AGENCIES (Apr.
2009), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794 696/download (noting in
the foreword that as of 2009, “the Department of Justice has shared over $4.5
billion in forfeited assets with more than 8,000 state and local law enforcement
agencies.”).
106. Fund, supra note 95.
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in November 2002—had given out 34 billion dollars in anti-terror
grants. 107
Today it is estimated that 90% of large city (over 50,000
citizens) and 80% of small city (25,000–50,000) police forces in the
United States have SWAT units. 108 In 2014, one of the leading
experts on SWAT in the United States testified before a Senate
Subcommittee that, conservatively, 60,000 SWAT deployments
occur every year. 109 According to a study conducted by the
American Civil Liberties Union, of the SWAT deployments in the
United States, approximately 62% were to execute search
warrants related to drugs 110 and, of those deployments, SWAT
used dynamic entry techniques over half the time. 111 Beyond drug
searches, SWAT units have been used to “patrol” high crime
neighborhoods (in full SWAT battle gear) to make INS detentions,
and in at least one instance, to allegedly break up an unauthorized
barber shop. 112

107. SHAWN REESE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40246, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO STATES AND LOCALITIES: A SUMMARY AND
ISSUES FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS 20 (2009).
108. See The Rise of SWAT: Sources, PBS (Mar. 16, 2016), http://ww
w.pbs.org/independentlens/content/the-rise-of-swat-sources./
(listing
SWAT
statistics pulled from a variety of sources) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
109. Hearing, supra note 93. But see PBS, supra note 108 (listing varying
statistics).
110. See ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 25, at 31 (explaining that the
primary use of SWAT teams has shifted from dealing with hostage or barricade
situations to responding to execute search warrants in drug investigations).
111. Id; see Balko, supra note 20 (noting over half of SWAT actions were in
private homes and used some form of forced entry) (on file with author).
112. See Radley Balko, Federal appeals court: Stop using SWAT-style raids
POST
(Sept.
19,
2014),
for
regulatory
inspections,
WASH.
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/19/federal-appeals-courtstop-using-swat-style-raids-for-regulatory-inspections (describing the increased
choice of regulatory agencies and police departments to deploy increased police
force to enforce seemingly minor offenses) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Cops or Soldiers?, ECONOMIST (Mar.
22, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21599349-americaspolice-have-become-too-militarised-cops-or-soldiers (describing that “some cities
use [SWAT] for routine patrols in high-crime areas,” and also referencing that a
SWAT team ended up being used for stopping individuals from “’barbering
without a license.’”).
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The growth of SWAT units within the United States, 113
coupled with the use of SWAT units for more diverse policing, 114
means SWAT teams have—and will—come into more contact with
citizens.
C. SWAT Tactics and Techniques
With SWAT deployments as frequent as described above, 115 it
is important to identify how SWAT teams operate differently than
the usual police team. These distinctions include a specialized
mission, 116 tactics, 117 equipment, 118 and uniforms. 119 Each of these
distinctions are important to understanding how the increasing
use of SWAT impacts the broader question of the public’s
perception of police legitimacy. 120
1. Mission
The SWAT mission is intended to be unique when compared
to other policing. This can be seen when comparing the definition
of SWAT provided by the National Tactical Officers Association 121

113. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1789 (“Between 1980 and 2000, there was
a 1400% increase in SWAT deployments.”). But see The Rise of SWAT Teams,
supra note 47 (saying that SWAT has increased 15,000% from the late 1970s to
today) (on file with author).
114. See id. (describing that this expansion has “increased primarily in
response to the ‘wars’ on drugs and terrorism.”).
115. Supra Section II.B.
116. Infra Section II.C.1.
117. Infra Section II.C.3.
118. Infra Section II.C.2.b.
119. Infra Section II.C.2.a.
120. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 38 (discussing police legitimacy pursuant to
an individual’s obedience to the law).
121. NAT’L TACTICAL OFFICERS ASS’N, SWAT STANDARDS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2 (2008), https://ntoa.org/massemail/swatstandards.pdf
[hereinafter NTOA] (“[A] designated law enforcement team whose members are
recruited, selected, trained, equipped and assigned to resolve critical incidents
involving threat to public safety which would otherwise exceed the capabilities of
traditional law enforcement first responders and/or investigative units”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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to the mission statements of the Boston, 122 Los Angeles, 123 New
York City, 124 and Dallas 125 police departments.
The mission statements for Boston, Los Angeles, New York
City, and Dallas police departments include a commitment to
creating a safer environment and working in partnership with the
community. 126 The above mission statements often include a
promise to treat citizens with respect. 127 Implicit in each statement
is an assumption that citizens are the constituents or if the police
department were a business, the citizens are the customers. 128
122. Mission Statement, BOSTON POLICE DEP’T, http://bpdnews.com/missionand-objectives/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Boston Mission Statement]
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
123. Mission Statement, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapd
online.org/inside_the_lapd (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Los Angeles
Mission Statement] (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
YORK
CITY
POLICE
DEP’T,
http://www.nyc.
124. Mission,
NEW
gov/html/nypd/html/administration/mission.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter New York Mission Statement] (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
125. Mission Statement, DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, http://www.dallaspolice.net/
abouts/missionstatement (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Dallas Mission
Statement] (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
126. See Boston Mission Statement, supra note 122 (indicating a commitment
to community safety through their mission statement); Los Angeles Mission
Statement, supra note 123; (outlining the goals of the Los Angeles Police
Department and their commitment to safety); New York Mission Statement, supra
note 124 (“The mission of the New York City Police Department is to enhance the
quality of life in New York City by working in partnership with the community to
enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce fear, and maintain order.”); Dallas
Mission Statement, supra note 125 (outlining the goals of the police department
to serve the people of Dallas, including methods of community cooperation).
127. See Boston Mission Statement, supra note 122 (“[W]orking in partnership
with the community . . . .”); Los Angeles Mission Statement, supra note 123
(“[C]onducting ourselves with the highest ethical standard to maintain public
confidence.”); New York Mission Statement, supra note 124 (“The department is
committed to accomplishing its mission . . . by treating every citizen
with . . . respect . . . .”); Dallas Mission Statement, supra note 125 (“Dallas Police
Department will conduct themselves in an ethical manner. They will respect and
protect the rights of citizens as determined by law . . . .”).
128. See Boston Mission Statement, supra note 122 (“[W]orking in partnership
with the community . . . .”); Los Angeles Mission Statement, supra note 123
(emphasizing that police will “work with” the communities); New York Mission
Statement, supra note 124 (“[W]orking in partnership with the community . . . .”);
Dallas Mission Statement, supra note 125 (“[G]oal is to help people and provide
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SWAT mission statements are harder to come by—of the four
police departments mentioned above, only the Los Angeles Police
Department had a mission statement on its webpage for the Metro
Division that includes the LAPD SWAT unit. 129 The mission
statement echoes the LAPD commitment to “community
policing,” 130 but suggests SWAT will assist in achieving effective
community policing by reducing the public’s fear of crime. 131 The
Metro Division describes itself in the following way:
Today, the primary responsibility of Metro is to provide support
to the Department’s community-based policing efforts by
deploying additional crime suppression resources throughout
the City. Assignments include uniformed crime suppression
details, as well as responding to high-risk barricaded situations,
stakeouts, security details, warrant service, and assisting
investigators in solving major crimes. 132

The National Tactical Officers Association describes the
purpose of SWAT as the following:
The primary characteristic of SWAT that distinguishes it from
other units is the focus of effort. SWAT teams are focused on
tactical solutions, as opposed to other functions, such as
investigation. The purpose of SWAT is to increase the likelihood
of safely resolving critical incidents. 133

What appears to be a key difference between the police and the
SWAT mindset/mission is the SWAT assumption that there is a
“critical incident” or “high risk” situation. Thus, when a SWAT
officer is deployed someone has already determined that the target

assistance at every opportunity.”).
129. See Metropolitan Division, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, http://www.
lapdonline.org/metropolitan_division (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter LA
Metro Mission Statement] (“Since 1967, the Los Angeles Police Department’s
Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) has provided a ready response to
situations that were beyond the capabilities of normally equipped and trained
Department personnel”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
130. Los Angeles Mission Statement, supra note 123.
131. LA Metro Mission Statement, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. See NTOA, supra note 121 (outlining the tactical response and operation
standards for the organization’s member agencies, including concepts to
standardize tactical law enforcement services).
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of the investigation is at least dangerous and probably guilty. 134
This is distinct from the broader policing mission, which seems to
assume the individuals police encounter are the very people they
are intended to protect. 135
2. SWAT Appearance
The SWAT mindset described above permeates every aspect of
a SWAT team, as surely as form follows function. This is reflected
as much in a SWAT officer’s appearance as in any other aspect.
The SWAT uniform is not a standard police uniform. Nor is SWAT
equipment the same as the standard equipment of a police officer.
Finally, things as simple as haircuts and eye wear mark the
distinction between the SWAT officer and the beat cop.
a. Uniforms
Although police uniforms can vary widely, most include a
nearly business-like appearance. Officers often wear a dark blue
trouser and shirt. 136 The color blue is so often chosen that police
are sometimes referred to as “the boys in blue” 137 and it is often
said that police officers bleed blue. 138 The shirt is usually button
134. See Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19 (describing that SWAT are supposed
to be used for “high-risk situations, such as terrorist attacks and hostage crises,”
and, recently, risk search warrants that may yield dangerous consequences to
police).
135. Compare NTOA, supra note 121 (“SWAT teams are focused on tactical
solutions . . . . [And] resolving critical incidents”), with New York Mission
Statement, supra note 124 (“The mission of the New York City Police Department
is to enhance the quality of life in New York City by working in partnership with
the community to enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce fear, and maintain
order.”).
136. Aarian Marshal, A History of Police Uniforms—and Why They Matter
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2014/08/a-history-of-policeuniforms and-why-they-matter/378660/ (on file with author).
137. See Boys in Blue, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2016) (“A humorous
name for the police.”).
138. The term “bleeding blue” is used as a term of solidarity to police and what
they do. If an officer is told he, or she, “bleeds blue” it means they are deemed to
have significant respect for not only their duty as public officers, but other police
officers as well. See generally NR Staff, Bleeding Blue: Honoring our Police, NAT’L
REV. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/ corner/424449/bleeding-
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down with two breast pockets, a collar, and, depending on the
weather, either long or short sleeves. 139 Virtually all police officers
wear a name tape on their uniform shirt above one of the breast
pockets. 140 The shirt and pants are capable of being pressed and
often are. 141 Many officers wear a tie and business style shoes. 142
Some officers wear a hat which looks much like a military dress
uniform hat, circular with a leather brim. 143
The SWAT uniform is usually some derivative of the military
“battle dress uniform” (BDU). 144 The uniform includes baggy pants
with large cargo pockets at the thighs and normal pockets higher
up. The BDU blouse is also baggy, button down, with cargo pockets
at the breast and below. SWAT officers sometimes do not have
name tapes on their BDU blouse. SWAT officers usually wear boots
rather than shoes. 145 Some SWAT officers also wear a balaclava,
blue-honoring-our-police-video (on file with author); Women ‘Bleed Blue’ in
http://www.
Support
of
Fallen
Police
Officer,
WBTV.COM,
wbtv.com/story/20377555/women-bleed-blue-in-support-of-fallen-police-officer
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with author).
139. See Richard R. Johnson, The Psychological Influence of the Police
Uniform, POLICEONE.COM (Mar. 4, 2005), https://www.policeone.com/policeproducts/ apparel/undergear/articles/99417-The-psychological-influence-of-thepolice-uni form/ (describing typical police attire) (on file with author); see also
Uniform Regulations, PEORIA POLICE DEP’T 512 (July 8, 2013),
https://www.peoriaaz.gov/uploadedfiles/newpeoriaaz/city_departments/police_de
partment/administration/policies/policy_1046_uniform_regulations.pdf
(describing the purpose and the use of having such regulations) (on file with
author); Personal Appearance, Uniform/Citizen’s Dress and Equipment, CHI.
POLICE DEP’T 3–5 (Oct. 26, 2016), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/
data/a7a57b9b-1562d157-70d15-62d1-a0e04429f1379599.pdf?hl=true (describing
the uniform specifications and appearance requirements) (on file with author);
Uniforms and Equipment, PHILA. POLICE DEP’T 2–9 (Apr. 15, 2011),
https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/directives/D6.7-UniformsAndEquipment.pdf
(last updated Sept. 11, 2014) (describing the prescribed uniform) (on file with
author).
140. See generally sources cited supra note 139.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See BDU–Battle Dress Uniforms, FAS: MIL. ANALYSIS NETWORK,
http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/bdu.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2016)
(describing that BDU’s are military, combat uniforms “not intended to be worn as
all-purpose uniforms.”).
145. See FBI SWAT Graphic, UNIF. CRIME REPORTING (Nov. 19, 2010),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/capabilities/fbi-swat-graphic [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING] (discussing SWAT gear) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
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which is headgear that covers the entire head, neck, and face of the
officer, often leaving only the eyes uncovered. 146 One author
referred to the SWAT balaclava as a “ninja style hood.” 147 Finally,
SWAT officers wear Kevlar helmets—the most common of these
are either similar or identical to the helmets worn by United States
service members during military exercises or in combat zones.
b. Equipment
A police officer’s standard equipment usually includes a
personal radio, a pistol, pen and paper, handcuffs, a flashlight, a
baton of some sort (there are a number of different size and
configurations), a cargo belt, and sometimes pepper spray or a
Taser. 148 Although the above list seems substantial, much of the
tools of force (for example, pistol, baton, handcuffs, Taser, pepper
spray) are often partially concealed in the cargo belt of the officer.
Some older style holsters that clip to the cargo belt cover the top of
the pistol handle. Even the officer’s radio is usually attached to the
belt with a hand set sometimes attached at the officer’s shoulder.
This arrangement allows the officer to have his or her hands free.
With hands free, and weapons partially concealed and stowed, the
officer can appear less threatening and is able to use her hands to
communicate.
An individual SWAT officer’s equipment, as described on the
Federal Bureau of Investigations webpage, is substantial. 149
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
146. See Pat Novesky, A Simple Cold Weather Survival Kit for Cops,
POLICEONE
(Feb.
8,
2011),
https://www.policeone.com/Officer-Safety/
articles/3329798-A-simple-cold-weather-survival-kit-for-cops/ (stating that police
balaclava covers most of an officer’s face) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); LAPG: LA POLICE GEAR,
http://www.lapolicegear.com/balaclavas.html (providing visual examples of
balaclavas) (on file with author).
147. JIM FISHER, SWAT MADNESS AND THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN
POLICE: A NATIONAL DILEMMA 13 (2010).
148. See generally OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER
REGARDING SAFETY EQUIPMENT (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www2.oaklandnet.
com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/webcontent/oak057728.pdf
[hereinafter
OAKLAND POLICE EQUIPMENT] (examining the police equipment required for the
Oakland police department as an example) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
149. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145 (describing how an

WHEN MORE IS LESS

159

Described on the webpage are the following standard equipment:
Kevlar helmet, goggles, bullet proof vest with modular lightweight
equipment weave, pouches for additional magazines of
ammunition, MP5 submachine gun with 30-round clip, medic pack
and flex handcuffs, waist belt with thigh harness for a pistol, pistol
(FBI recommended .45 caliber with 8 round capacity), gloves, knee
pads, gas mask, and additional tools for breaching (could include,
collapsible sledge hammer, modified crow bar, and battering
ram). 150 When observing the FBI SWAT officer in full personal
equipment, images of dystopic fiction come to mind. 151 The officer’s
eyes are completely obscured by the goggles which, as depicted on
the FBI webpage, are tinted. 152 Virtually all of the officer’s body is
concealed. 153 The officer has two weapons loaded with 38 rounds of
ammunition in magazines and the capacity for much more
ammunition and extra magazines in pouches attached to the
officer’s bullet proof vest. 154 The officer is wearing a military style
Kevlar helmet and bullet proof vest with groin protection, giving
the unmistakable appearance of a soldier in a combat situation. 155
3. Tactics
The tactics employed by police officers on a day in, day out
basis are as varied as the circumstances the police encounter.
However, because the focus of this article is on the impact of SWAT
means and methods, and the majority of SWAT deployments are
for the execution of search warrants, 156 the techniques used by

assaulter may be outfitted for a mission).
150. See id. (outlining and illustrating the standard equipment used by SWAT
officers).
151. See generally EQUILIBRIUM (Dimension Films & Blue Tulip Productions
2002); ULTRAVIOLET (Screen Gems & Ultravi Productions 2006) (showing specific
examples of police in movies).
152. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145 (displaying a visual of
SWAT goggles and describing their capacity to withstand blasts and stop debris).
153. Id.
154. See id. (explaining the amount of ammunition a SWAT officer carries for
a mission).
155. Id.
156. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19.
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police or SWAT during the execution of a search warrant will be
the focus of this discussion of tactics.
a. Police
The manner in which police execute a search warrant is
significantly impacted by the circumstances. 157 But an officer’s
default position is important. By way of example this article will
use the standard operating procedures (SOP) for executing search
warrants employed by the Fairfax County, Virginia Police
Department. 158 After the officer in charge of the search has
reviewed all the information relevant to the search (site
characteristics, items to be searched for, individuals likely to be
present during the search, etc.) 159 and positioned his search
team, 160 he or she shall:
[N]otify persons inside the search site of the team's presence,
and shall announce, in a voice loud enough to be heard inside
the search site, that they are the Fairfax County Police and they
have a warrant to search the premises and they demand
admission to the premises at once. 161

According to the SOP, after notification officers should wait at
least twenty to sixty seconds before entering the place to be

157. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255–58 (1979) (discussing that
a police officer’s actions are subject to the standard of reasonability under the
circumstances).
158. See FAIRFAX CTY. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS AND
GENERAL ORDERS VOLUME I —ADMINISTRATION, https://docs.google.com/viewer?
url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fairfaxcounty.gov%2Fpolice%2Finside-fcpd%2Fpdf%
2Fgeneralordersvolumeiprint.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (explaining the
responsibilities and standards of the Fairfax County Police Department) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
159. See FAIRFAX CTY. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS AND
GENERAL
ORDERS
VOLUME
II—OPERATIONS,
463–72,
http:/www.
fairfaxcounty.gov/police/inside-fcpd/pdf/generalordersvolumeiiprint.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 21, 2016) (discussing the Fairfax County Police Department’s search
warrant procedures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
160. See id. at 467 (discussing where the Fairfax County Police Department
should position itself in various situations).
161. Id. at 467–68.
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searched. 162 The guide further notes that “[w]henever possible,
premises shall be entered in a courteous and non-destructive
manner. No force shall be initiated unless resistance is made by a
person in the premises, or factors identified in Section V, D, are
present.” 163 Finally, the SOP notes that persons at the search
location are to “be treated with as much restraint and courtesy as
possible under the circumstances” 164 and police may not arrest,
search, or frisk persons present merely because they are
present. 165 The SOP does note that persons present during a search
may have their movement restricted, and the United States
Supreme Court has held that individuals present during a search
authorized by a warrant may be detained until the search is
completed. 166
b. SWAT
The police search protocols described above are significantly
different from the SWAT methods commonly employed. Although
SWAT teams do not possess any greater legal authority than police
when executing a search warrant, because SWAT has been chosen,
someone—usually through the use of a threat matrix—has
concluded there is an enhanced risk. 167 Thus, SWAT deployments

162. Id. at 468.
163. See id. (noting the factors incorporated by reference as including “[f]irm
indication that an occupant of the premises is armed . . . information that an
occupant has a history of violence . . knowledge that an occupant would intend to
frustrate searches . . . [and] knowledge that some occupants would be
endangered.”).
164. Id. at 470.
165. Id. at 470–71.
166. Id. at 470. See generally Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
167. See Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), CITY OF TUCSON,
https://www.tucsonaz.gov/police/swat (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter CITY
OF TUCSON] (“S.W.A.T. Team is to provide the department with the capability to
safely resolve high-risk situations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see, e.g., Jack Ryan, Special Operations, GEO.
U. L. CTR. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 10 (Apr. 17, 2008) (“Risk assessment is based
on facts and circumstances stated in the affidavit for the arrest or search warrant,
knowledge of the target location and the criminal history of the suspect(s). A copy
of the warrant should be attached to the Risk Assessment Matrix.”).
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begin with a conclusion that the usual rules that apply to executing
a search warrant do not apply.
SWAT teams use several methods to enter a home. Two
common methods include: dynamic entry and deliberate entry. 168
Dynamic entries have been considered the primary method of
entering and have been described in some detail earlier in this
Article so it will not be rehashed here. 169
Deliberate entry has some of the same characteristics as a
dynamic entry, but does not have the same “blitzkrieg”
approach. 170 A deliberate entry focuses on a slow, methodical
application of force. 171 During such an entry, the target is breached
but not in a rush. 172 Police secure an entry point and then use
mirrors and a slow deployment of officers to move from room to
room. 173 Rather than every officer shouting orders, a single officer
with an amplifier announces the police’s presence and gives orders
to the individuals inside the target house. 174
D. Procedural Justice/SWAT Conflict
A significant number of elements important to procedural
justice are clearly at odds with SWAT. From mission, to
appearance, to equipment, to tactics, SWAT is, in some ways, the
antithesis of procedural justice. As mentioned above, procedural
justice is impacted by factors that are within the immediate control
of police as well as factors that are beyond the officer’s influence in
the moment. 175 The focus of this discussion is on those factors
within police control.
168. See French, supra note 11 (discussing the two different types of SWAT
team entrances when responding to a warrant).
169. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1817 (describing dynamic entries and how
integral they are in SWAT tactics).
170. French, supra note 11.
171. See id. (discussing the advantages and differences between a dynamic
entry and a deliberate entry).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 154 (discussing that the officer can control
his behavior, his apparent honesty, and overall ethicality of his actions).

WHEN MORE IS LESS

163

Beginning with Professors Thibaut and Walker’s work,
through Professor Tyler’s, is the observation that having a say 176
in the resolution of an encounter with police is critical to a
perception of procedural justice. There is nothing about a SWAT
deployment that suggests to a citizen or a suspect that they have
any say in what is occurring. 177
Before discussing tactics, a few words about SWAT
appearance and equipment is in order. Experts in the field of
communication have found that communication is at least 50%
non-verbal—thus we take at least 50% of whatever message we
receive in a situation from non-verbal ques. 178 Simply the
appearance and the type of equipment that SWAT officers often go
into the field with are counter to encouraging communication. 179
This is both subtle and overt. Beginning with the SWAT attire, it
seems clear that a fair degree of consideration is given to the
uniform an officer wears. The non-SWAT police duty uniform
conveys approachable professionalism. It sometimes includes
entirely superfluous components, like a tie. Arguably the sole
purpose of a tie in a police uniform is to make police seem like any
other professionals in our society. The battle dress uniform of the
SWAT marks the wearer as a soldier. 180 Soldiers do not seek to
blend in with civilian society. The military is a distinct, mostly
closed, subculture within our society. 181 Further, where we are
176. See id. at 116–17 (discussing the impact of not only allowing individuals
an opportunity to speak, but creating a perception that the officer is considering
what is being said in resolving the dispute).
177. See French, supra note 11 (describing the purpose of SWAT dynamic
entries is to execute with maximum speed and force); see also Rahall, supra note
10, at 1826–27 (describing that SWAT entries and deployments resemble that of
military tactics that induce terrifying effects).
178. See generally Fred C. Lunenburg, Louder Than Words: The Hidden
Power of Nonverbal Communication in the Workplace, 12 INT’L J. SCHOLARLY
ACAD. INTELL. DIVERSITY 1 (2010).
179. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145.
180. Id.
181. See Josh Rothman, America’s New Military Culture, BOSTON.COM (Sept.
14, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/
2011/09/americas_new_mi.html (“Today's military is very different. The link
between civilian and military culture is gone; instead, the military has a culture
of its own, to which soldiers eagerly adapt”) (on file with author); see also Thomas
E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between Military and Society, ATLANTIC (July, 1997),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/07/the-widen
ing-gapbetween-military-and-society/306158/ (“[O]ver the next twenty years the U.S.
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taught from early in our lives that we can approach a police officer
for help—no such messaging regarding soldiers/service members
exists. 182
Aggravating the distinction between a uniform meant to
convey inclusion versus exclusion, is the equipment of SWAT. The
combination of Kevlar helmet, tinted goggles, and occasionally, the
balaclava and gas mask, effectively removes any ability to see the
eyes or face of a SWAT officer. This obscuring of the officer from
the neck up cuts off eye contact and facial expressions—two major
methods of non-verbal communication. 183 Next, many SWAT
officers deploy with two weapons, a rifle and a handgun. 184 As
noted above, police officers normally have just one weapon, a pistol,
when on patrol. 185 The two weapons, one being an assault rifle,
conveys an extremely aggressive posture. This is exaggerated by
the fact that, in a deployed setting, the rifles are carried “at the
ready,” which is to say, in both hands with a finger near the trigger
of the weapon. Further, even the holster for the pistol is different
for the SWAT officer. 186 Rather than a pistol on an equipment belt,
the SWAT pistol holster is slung low on the thigh, giving the
unmistakable appearance of an old west gunslinger. 187
Additionally, the overt (visible on the outside of the shirt) flak
vest, elbow and knee pads, and pouches of additional ammunition,
all convey the message of a soldier at war, 188 and rarely do people
feel encouraged to talk with a soldier at war. The collective effect
of police in military attire is to signal in an immediate way to a
citizen that this is an emergency police situation that involves the
potential use of immediate deadly force.
military will revert to a kind of garrison status, largely self-contained and
increasingly distinct as a society and subculture”) (on file with author).
182. See What to Teach Kids About Strangers, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION
COUNS., http://www.ncpc.org/topics/violent-crime-and-personal-safety/strangers
(last visited Nov. 21, 2016) (saying that a police officer is a “very recognizable
safe” stranger whom parents should teach to their children that they are okay to
trust) (on file with author).
183. Lunenburg, supra note 178.
184. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145.
185. See OAKLAND POLICE EQUIPMENT, supra note 148 (describing the Oakland
Police Department’s required equipment).
186. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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More important than equipment and attire to the discussion
of SWAT and procedural justice are SWAT tactics. Since most of
SWAT deployments today are in the context of serving warrants, 189
it will be in that context that this discussion focuses. Neither of the
two primary methods that SWAT use to execute warrants is
conducive to communication—the essence of any of these tactics is
to gain compliance. 190 Although neither support or encourage a
sense of procedural justice—one seems worse than the other.
Particularly adverse to the core elements that determine whether
an individual feels they have been treated fairly 191 is the dynamic
entry tactic. In stories in the media and in research, this technique
is discussed again and again. 192 From a communication
perspective, the dynamic entry is weak in two ways. First, and
most importantly for procedural justice, there is clearly no
opportunity for individuals being searched to have input in the
immediate resolution of events. 193 The officers assume the
occupants of the home are armed and dangerous—they seek to
“dominate” the home with speed and a degree of violence. 194
Clearly there is no opportunity for the occupants to have input, but
there is also a reduced degree of communication from the officers
to the occupants. 195 When executing a dynamic entry, often all
officers entering the home are shouting “Police. Search
warrant” 196—this adds to the dominating and shocking effect of the
189. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19; French, supra note 11.
190. Id.
191. Tyler, supra note 50, at 128–30, 135–37.
192. See generally Rex M. Shannon III, Nightmare on Your Street: Moving
Towards Justice for Innocent Victims of Wrong-Premises SWAT Raids, 77 Miss.
L.J. 669 (2007); Jessica M. Weitzman, They Won’t Come Knocking No More:
Hudson v. Michigan and the Demise of the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 73 Brook.
L. Rev 1209 (2008); Radley Balko, “Dynamic Entry” Raids are Still Dangerous for
Cops, Too, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/29/dynamic-entry-raids-are-still-dangerous-for-copstoo/ (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
193. See FRENCH, supra note 11 (describing how SWAT teams enter the
premises, go room-to-room “clearing” threats with overwhelming force).
194. See id. (stating that “‘Dynamic Entry’ is a tactic where surprise, speed,
and domination are key.”).
195. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1822 (describing incidents where SWAT
teams accidentally raided innocent homes, and did not realize it was the wrong
home until after considerable amounts of damage and fear had been dealt).
196. See Brian Patrick Schaefer, Knocking on the Door: Police Decision Points
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entry. With multiple individuals shouting, it can be very difficult
to hear or understand any one person. Hearing directions from
police are made worse by the use of smoke or flash bang grenades—
which are used to disorient. 197 When smoke is used, officers
sometimes wear protective gas masks, thus making it even more
difficult to understand what is being said. 198
Other elements of procedural justice are obviously going to
suffer in most dynamic entries as well. Whether the officer was
ethical is one of the seven components Professor Tyler incorporates
in his discussion of the components of procedural justice. 199 Ethics
in this context includes whether the officer was polite and
concerned with the rights of the individuals involved. 200 Officers
conducting a dynamic entry clearly are not concerned with
politeness, but the degree of force used—often including threats
and sometimes profane language 201—makes this tactic
particularly harmful to a sense of procedural justice. The
employment of force without regard to actions on the part of the
occupants—breaking down doors, using grenades, etc.—would also
call into question the officers’ concern for individual rights.
III. The Fourth Amendment and SWAT
When reading accounts of SWAT teams executing search
warrants by smashing in doors in the middle of the night without
warning, throwing smoke and flash-bang grenades into a house,
and then detaining all the residents at the end of a drawn assault

in Executing Search Warrants, 127 U. LOUISVILLE ELECTRONIC THESES
DISSERTATIONS
(2015),
http://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3029&context=etd
(describing the scene when officers yell “Police, Search Warrant.”).
197. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1819 (stating that flash-bangs are “intended
to distract and startle the residents.”).
198. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145.
199. TYLER, supra note 50, at 163.
200. Id. at 138.
201. See Brian S. Batterton, Profanity and the Use of Force, LEGAL LIABILITY
& RISK MGMT. INST. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_
questions/4-feb10.shtml (describing a case when a SWAT team deployed and
issued profanity-laced commands) (on file with author).
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rifles, 202 the natural question to ask is, how is this legal? What
protection does the Constitution provide against such police
action? The answer is some. The potential conflict between SWAT
means and methods and the protections provided to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment is obvious, 203 but the inherently dangerous
and variable circumstances in which police operate demands
flexibility in the use of force. Although much of the Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence centers on when police
may conduct a search and for what, several cases also focus on how
police may search—particularly focusing on how police are
permitted to enter a home. Should the police unreasonably violate
a clearly established constitutional right, they are subject to civil
suit. 204 The line of cases the Supreme Court has decided that are
most relevant to SWAT activity have dealt with the issues
involving the “knock and announce” rule.
Since at least 1603, Anglo-American law has contained a
requirement that when police serve a search warrant they must
usually knock and announce themselves. 205 Further, in most
circumstances police must give the occupant in the home the
opportunity to open the door 206 before the door is forced open. The
Fourth Amendment itself is clearly broad enough to capture the
how of a search, as well as the what and when. The Amendment
protects:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 207

202. ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 25, at 9.
203. U.S. CONST.amend. IV.
204. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
205. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
206. The opportunity to open the door is somewhat variable. In cases
involving drugs, police generally must knock and announce themselves and wait
a “reasonable period of time,” which is not tied to how long it would take to answer
the door. See United States v. Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2002)
(stating that a reasonable period of time for an officer to wait after knocking on a
door may depend on the circumstances of the situation).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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In Wilson v. Arkansas 208 the Supreme Court first announced
that the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment included
the “knock and announce” rule. 209 Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority, traced the long history of the doctrine to the Semayne 210
case. 211 In Semayne the judge concluded that before breaking down
a door to serve a warrant, a sheriff ought to knock and announce
his authority to enter. 212 The judge in Semayne also noted:
For the law without a default in the owner abhors the
destruction or breaking of any home (which is for the habitation
and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience
might ensue to the party, when no default is in him, for perhaps
he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to
be presumed that he would obey it. 213

Based on Semayne, a host of other founding era sources, 214 and
a 1958 United States Supreme Court decision, Miller v. United
States, 215 a unanimous Court found that
Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the
practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of
an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or
seizure. Contrary to the decision below, we hold that in some
circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home
might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 216
208. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
209. See id. at 929 (holding that the court considers if officers “knocked and
announced” regarding whether a search was reasonable).
210. Semayne, 77 Eng. Rep.
211. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
212. Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B. 1603);
see Robert J. Driscoll, Unannounced Police Entries and Destruction of Evidence
after Wilson v. Arkansas, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7 (1995) (saying that
the “sheriff was required to announce his authority and purpose.”).
213. Id. at 196.
214. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931–32 (1995).
215. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
216. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 (1995). The Supreme Court noted in Dalia v.
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979):
[That] nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court's
decisions interpreting that language suggests that, in addition to the
three requirements discussed above, search warrants also must
include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be
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Even when dealing with drug cases the Supreme Court has
concluded the “knock and announce” rule applies, absent exigent
circumstances. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 217 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court sought to maintain a blanket rule authorizing
police to conduct no knock entries whenever a search warrant
involved drugs. 218 The Supreme Court struck down the blanket
rule and announced that
In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the
destruction of evidence. 219

The Court in Wilson and Richards noted that there are
exceptions to the basic knock and announce rule. In Wilson, the
Court stated that the knock and announce rule could give way
“under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence,” or
“[when] police officers have reason to believe that evidence would
likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.” 220 Another
exception to the knock and announce rule includes situations
where such an action would be futile. 221
One final case, Hudson v. Michigan, 222 regarding the “knock
and announce” rule, needs to be discussed. 223 The question in
Hudson was whether application of the exclusionary rule was
appropriate when addressing a knock and announce violation. 224 A
executed. On the contrary, it is generally left to the discretion of the
executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with
the performance of a search authorized by warrant—subject of course
to the general Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
217. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
218. Id. at 388.
219. Id. at 394.
220. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995); see also Ker v. State of
Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (discussing how certain codifications of the
common law may not require compliance if the officer is exposed to danger).
221. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
222. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
223. See id. (discussing whether evidence should be excluded in light of a
violation of the knock and announce rule).
224. Id. at 590.
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divided Court concluded that it was not. 225 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, concluded that the interests protected by the
knock and announce rule were human life, dignity, and property;
not shielding evidence from the government. 226 Thus, the
exclusionary rule would not apply where the government’s only
violation of the Fourth Amendment involved the knock and
announce rule. 227 Justice Scalia also asserted that there were other
methods of redress, specifically through a civil suit for damages,
that were adequate. 228
The cases dealing with the knock and announce rule make
clear that Fourth Amendment reasonableness includes how a
search is conducted as well as when and what police may search
for or seize. 229 Although Hudson has limited the impact of violating
the knock and announce rule in criminal trials, it clarifies the
important interests that are protected by the Fourth Amendment
Thus, when individuals bring suit for
beyond privacy. 230
unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment the interests at
stake are even more clear. 231
The standard for bringing a civil suit for a violation of the
Fourth Amendment is high: plaintiffs must establish an
unreasonable violation of a clearly established rule. 232 However,
the fact that the Court has clarified the knock and announce rule
does make a civil suit more plausible. The United States Supreme
Court has not addressed a case whose focus is on civil liability for
SWAT style techniques, but several of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals have. With greater frequency, these courts have found the

225. Id. at 594
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 596–99.
229. See supra notes 208–228 (discussing cases dealing with the knock and
announce rule); infra notes 230–32 (citing cases evaluating the knock and
announce rule).
230. See Hudson v. Michigan., 547 U.S. 586, 594 (protecting human life and
limb).
231. See id. (clarifying what interests the Fourth Amendment and the knock
and announce requirement does, and does not protect).
232. See Saucer v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (discussing elements
plaintiff must prove to win a civil suit for a Fourth Amendment violation).

WHEN MORE IS LESS

171

use of SWAT techniques, particularly the use of flash bang
grenades, to provide a proper basis for civil liability. 233
IV. Solutions
It seems three facts are clear. First, SWAT deployments have
become excessive. 234 Not every drug search is one that is inherently
dangerous or requires the militarized methods employed by SWAT
teams. 235 Further, SWAT techniques are contrary to several of the
elements that impact procedural justice. 236 Because SWAT units
operate under an assumption that there is an imminent threat to
life, limb, or evidence—there is no opportunity for discussion.
Third, SWAT teams are necessary to confront the situations where
normal police methods and weapons are inadequate. 237 A
barricaded assailant, hostage situations, or assailants armed with
military grade weaponry must be responded to in a timely manner.
It is not realistic to rely on either the non-SWAT police or the
military. Further, to have a truly effective SWAT unit requires a
great deal of specialized training and equipment. 238 The logical
conclusion to be derived from these facts is that a coherent SWAT
policy must reduce police discretion when SWAT deployments
occur while still retaining the flexibility to use SWAT when
necessary. The natural body to carry out this function is the
judiciary. Further, more centralized control over the use of SWAT
233. See generally Milan v. Bolon, 795 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2015); Edwards v.
Byrd, 750 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2014); Escobado v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770 (7th Cir.
2010).
234. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1789 (“Between 1980 and 2000, there was
a 1400% increase in SWAT deployments.”). But see The Rise of SWAT Teams,
supra note 47 (saying that SWAT has increased 15,000% from the late 1970’s to
today) (on file with author)
235. ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 25, at 34.
236. But see PETER B. KRASKA, Community Policing in Battle Garb: A Paradox
or Coherent Strategy?, in MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE, 82 (2001) (discussing
why some members of the law enforcement community argue that the rise of
SWAT and community policing work together and not against one another).
237. See KLINGER & ROJEK supra note 79, at 2 (describing that certain violent
episodes can “easily outstrip the capacity” of normal law enforcement officers).
238. See infra Section IV.B (discussing some of the current training standards
for SWAT members).
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units is necessary. Thus, states and the federal government should
create centralized organizations that unify policy and ensure a
high degree of training and readiness.
A. Judicial Approval of SWAT Deployments
Numerous legislatures have, from time to time, passed
statutes that authorize judges or magistrates to issue “no knock”
warrants. In 1970, Congress passed the comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act which expressly authorized
federal judges and magistrates to issue “no knock” warrants. 239
Four years later that express authority was repealed, 240 although
the Supreme Court has found that the authority to execute a no
knock entry still exists as part of the exigent circumstances
exception. 241 Legislatures could enact statutes that authorized
judges and magistrates to issue SWAT warrants. Under such a
regime, police who wish to use SWAT units as part of executing a
search warrant would have to provide specific articulable facts that
justify the use of SWAT and the specific SWAT means or methods
to be used. Such warrants would authorize or deny: active use of
SWAT officers to execute a warrant; types of weapons authorized;
whether diversionary devices like smoke or flash bang grenades
were justified; and whether a knock and announce requirement
could be suspended.
By statute, several states allow magistrates to issue “no
knock” warrants based upon a proper showing by police. 242 The
showing necessary to secure a “no knock” warrant varies. Some
states require that “the affiant [have] good cause to believe that
there is a risk of serious physical harm to the law enforcement
239. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 879(b) (1970).
240. Pub. L. 93-481, § 3, Oct. 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 1455.
241. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36–37 (2003) (“When a warrant
applicant gives reasonable grounds to expect futility or to suspect that one or
another such exigency already exists or will arise instantly upon knocking, a
magistrate judge is acting within the Constitution to authorize a ‘no-knock’
entry.”).
242. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.12(A) (West 2010); § 2933.231(B); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT., 108-8 / § 5 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-411 (1995); OKLA. STAT., tit.
22, § 1228 (Supp. 1997); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35-9 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-23-210 (West 1995).
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officers” 243 if they adhere to the normal announcement rules, or “a
showing of specific facts . . . that the officer reasonably believes
that if notice were given a weapon would be used [or] . . . evidence
will be destroyed.”244
The statutes above, and others like them, provide a ground
work for a more expansive statute that addresses other SWAT
techniques. A law that requires an affiant to provide specific
articulable facts, and the source of those facts that justify SWAT
use, would require the force associated with a SWAT deployment
be necessary rather than a “just in case” use of force. Further, even
if a SWAT warrant was sought and not granted, police could have
SWAT units pre-deployed at the scene of the search and held in
reserve. Such a pre-deployment would permit police to have SWAT
teams in vehicles and at the ready if their previously unsupported
concerns became a reality.
The above proposed solution, like most compromises, can be
criticized as having either gone too far or not far enough.
Traditionally, the manner in which a search warrant is executed
is left to the judgement of the police, with the caveat that they must
do so reasonably. 245 Such an arrangement gives law enforcement
front end discretion and thereby greater freedom of action. 246
Those who favor this arrangement will likely argue that police, and
not judges, are in the best position to assess threats and determine
what force is appropriate to a given situation. Those most
concerned with SWAT deployments will likely argue that judges
are an inadequate barrier to the abuse of SWAT, especially if the
standard for the use of SWAT is reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause. Further, if police are permitted to preposition
SWAT teams, those inclined to abuse SWAT resources will
exaggerate claims of exigent circumstances in order to use SWAT
even when not authorized by a judge.

243. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.231(B) (West 2010).
244. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT., 108-8 / § 5 (1992).
245. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 239 (1979) (“[T]he manner in
which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial review as to its
reasonableness.”).
246. See L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (saying that the
standard is of reasonableness because there are circumstances where, inter alia,
safety for others and the officers themselves is needed).
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Although all of the above criticisms raise valid concerns,
restraint and flexibility are required in determining when SWAT
is appropriate for serving warrants. The claim by police that judges
are ill equipped to determine when SWAT is needed can be
remedied by police affidavits thoroughly describing why a
particular situation requires SWAT methods. The Supreme Court
has already articulated “reasonable suspicion” as the floor for such
determinations, at least with regard to “no knock” warrants. 247 If
this were adopted as the standard for other SWAT methods, it
would be very hard to argue this bar is too high. For those who
argue that judges will simply become rubber stamps and be overly
deferential to police, this would seem an indictment of the entire
search warrant system. It could be argued that matters of safety
are different than matters of legal authority to search. No judge
wants to deny a search warrant authorizing SWAT, only to have
police officers or members of the public harmed from dangerous
criminals that would have been stopped had SWAT been deployed.
But, of course, no judge wants to authorize the use of flash-bang
grenades in a search and have a 71-year-old grandmother suffer a
heart attack 248 or have an officer shot by an innocent home owner
who responded with force when their home was stormed by armed
officers who did not announce themselves. In short, judges will
have to do what they always do: weigh evidence and make a
determination based on an application of the law to the facts.
The advantages of judge issued SWAT authorizations are
several. The requirement to go outside of the law enforcement
community to receive authorization for SWAT and specific SWAT
techniques will likely reduce the number of SWAT deployments, or
at least result in a more universally thoughtful process in
determining when to deploy and what methods to use. By having
a neutral and detached magistrate examining the evidence to
support the use of SWAT and specific methods, law enforcement’s
capacity to engage in post hoc justification of SWAT use would be
reduced. The new default position would be to present all the
247. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (comparing a
“reasonable suspicion” standard with a “probable cause” standard).
248. Lucy Steigerwald, Wrong Door and Flash-Bang Grenade Heart Attack
Provoke
Lawsuits,
REASON
(Oct.
13,
2011,
12:28
PM),
http://reason.com/blog/2011/10/13/wrong-door-raid-and-flash-bang (on file with
author).
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evidence relevant to why SWAT was necessary to the magistrate—
if the deployment is authorized, so be it. If it is not authorized and
SWAT is used nonetheless, only circumstances that became known
after the search warrant was sought would be relevant. Officers
who used SWAT without a warrant could face a greater likelihood
of civil law suit—since the clearly established rule would be to
secure a SWAT warrant ahead of executing the warrant. Because
police could still use SWAT if true exigent circumstances arose,
SWAT would be put more properly in the “break in case of
emergency” box that it belongs in.
B. Centralizing Control over SWAT
As mentioned above, eighty percent of police departments in
small cities (25,000–50,000) and virtually all larger police
departments have SWAT teams. 249 Additionally, numerous federal
agencies allegedly have SWAT or SWAT-like capabilities. 250 Many
of these federal agencies are the sort that clearly should have a
SWAT capability—the FBI and Secret Service for example.
However, other organizations like the Department of Education,
Department of Agriculture, and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, would seem to have little need for SWAT—but they
nonetheless are alleged to have teams with SWAT capabilities. 251
249. PBS, supra note 108.
250. See Rand Paul, Rand Paul: We Must Demilitarize the Police, TIME (Aug.
14, 2014), http://time.com/3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police/ (saying that
“‘federal agencies of all stripes . . . come equipped with SWAT teams and heavy
artillery.’”). But see Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Rand Paul’s Grand, Inaccurate Retelling
of “Federal SWAT Team” Raids, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/09/01/rand-paulsgrand-inaccurate-retelling-of-federal-swat-team-raids/ (discussing that Steve
Lenkart, Executive Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association,
said that the only federal agency that has an actual SWAT team is the FBI) (on
file with author).
251. Fund, supra note 95.
Dozens of federal agencies now have Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) teams to further an expanding definition of their
missions . . . the Department of Agriculture, the Railroad Retirement
Board . . . . [all of these have their own SWAT units and are part of a
worrying trend towards the militarization of federal agencies].
Id.
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Most officers who are members of a SWAT team perform their
SWAT duties part time. In a recent study done by the National
Tactical Officers Association, 90% of the departments and agencies
surveyed reported that their SWAT officers were part time,
meaning that the officers were participating in SWAT activities as
part of their police work rather than all the time. 252 In that same
survey, most officers responding claimed the policies and
procedures for their SWAT units were derived from their own
agency. 253 However, it is necessary to note that the results of this
question on the study are confusing. Officers and agencies were
asked about the sources for their unit’s training and policies. 254
The results were the following: 85.4% stated the source was their
own agency; 41.6% stated the source was state/regional tactical
officers associations; 35.5% stated the source was municipal or
county law enforcement agencies; 7.3% claimed the source was
private vendors; 10.6% claimed state law enforcement agency;
7.1% stated the U.S. military; 5.1% stated federal law enforcement
agency; and 4.7% stated other. 255 In order for these percentages to
be correct, respondents to the survey must have listed multiple
sources. Based on the above information, SWAT units are part
time, spread across county, city, and state police departments, or
a wide range of federal agencies, some of which would appear to
have little need for SWAT capabilities. Such a diffuse distribution
of assets is arguably wasteful and, likely to result in misuse of
SWAT assets.
Maintaining a SWAT unit is resource intensive, even on a
part-time basis. The current recommended guidelines from the
National Tactical Officers Associations for part-time SWAT
officers are substantial. The minimum recommended standards
are the following: prerequisite, forty hours basic SWAT course;
monthly, sixteen hours critical skills maintenance; specialty
252. See SWAT STUDY, supra note 44, at 9 (noting the varying composition of
SWAT units, ranging from being staffed by exclusively-full time personnel, to
units staffed by exclusively part-time personnel) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
253. See id. at 11 (discussing apparent discrepancies in survey answers when
officers were asked what sources their agencies relied on to create training
procedures and policies).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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assignments, an additional eight hours per month (i.e., long rifle,
tactical emergency medical support, etc.); annual, forty hours inservice full team training. 256
Even assuming that police departments are following
minimum standards for their part-time SWAT units such training
is likely inadequate for the SWAT mission. This conclusion is
based on the National Tactical Officers Association guidelines for
full time SWAT units. 257 The recommended minimum amount of
training time for full time SWAT units is 25% of a duty month. 258
Thus, to meet minimum recommended standards, officers should
be training one in four days. 259 If the two-days-a-month minimum
suggested for part-time SWAT units was enough, then there would
be no reason to require more for full time units.
Centralizing command and control over state SWAT units and
federal units would also lead to greater standardization of
procedure. Currently, SWAT standards appear to come from
multiple sources, including state agencies, federal agencies, the
United States military, local and regional law enforcement
agencies, commercial sources, and others. 260
By creating full time SWAT units under a single command in
a given state or the federal government, policies and procedures
could be standardized across the state or federal government. Such
a system would remove unnecessary and unhelpful administrative
redundancies and streamline changes that create more effective
SWAT deployments. A system of top down review of SWAT actions
would include all SWAT units, not just those departments that
choose to be reflective about SWAT activity. Finally, centralizing
256. See NTOA, supra note 121, at 7 (discussing the minimum recommended
training standards for part-time SWAT officers).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See SWAT STUDY, supra note 44, at 11, tbl.9 (identifying sources of
SWAT procedures). According to Mark Lomax, Executive Director for the NTOA,
SWAT standards and procedures are governed intra-departmentally. Meaning,
each police agency, whether that be state, local, or county, have complete
autonomy pursuant to its SWAT control, independent of the other agencies.
Though independent associations, like the NTOA, IACP, and the Commission for
Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) have strong influence over what standards
there should be, they are merely recommendations. Telephone Interview by Brett
Lawrence with Mark Lomax, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Tactical Officers Ass’n (2016).
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control for SWAT units at the state or federal level could create a
SWAT system that is more responsive to public concerns about
overuse of SWAT. It can be difficult to find the “responsible
individual” in the current system. Who decides to deploy SWAT
and when can be different depending on the town, or state, or
federal agency. 261 The NTOA study discussed above observed that
currently the authority to deploy SWAT assets can reside in any of
the following depending on the jurisdiction: the first officer at the
scene; the field supervisor; the watch commander; the SWAT
commander; the Mayor; a county executive; or other. 262 With a
single chain of command that ultimately leads to a governor or the
President it is easier to find with whom the buck stops. One of the
several factors that enhances a sense of procedural justice
observed by Professor Tyler is the sense of knowing who a
complaint can be brought to and a mechanism for accountability. 263
Centralizing the chain of command for SWAT units can thereby
enhance a sense of procedural justice.
Of course there are a number of arguments that can be raised
against centralizing the SWAT chain of command. Two in
particular deserve discussion. First, that consolidating SWAT
assets to a state or federal chain of command and limiting it to fulltime SWAT officers will make SWAT less responsive to time
sensitive events. Second, that the proposal is financially
untenable—currently 90% of SWAT units are part-time. 264 By
requiring SWAT units to be full time the state or federal
government would have to significantly, if not massively, expand
the number of its law enforcement officers.
Response time for SWAT units is a valid concern. Any program
that seeks to centralize control over SWAT assets would have to
include response time concerns into whatever calculus they use to
determine where SWAT assets should be prepositioned.
Additionally, law enforcement communication systems would have
to be streamlined to ensure that police departments which did not
261. SWAT STUDY, supra note 44.
262. See SWAT STUDY, supra note 44, at 15, tbl. 16 (identifying sources of
authority to deploy SWAT assets in a survey of various law enforcement groups
that contain SWAT assets).
263. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 29 (discussing aspects of procedural
justice).
264. SWAT STUDY, supra note 44, at 7.
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have SWAT units collocated with them could rapidly request a
SWAT deployment if the need arose. Although SWAT
responsiveness is an appropriate concern, most SWAT
deployments are thoroughly planned and deliberately executed.
Currently most SWAT operations are not like deploying
firefighters; SWAT officials usually know hours or more that the
unit is going to deploy. 265
Next is a question of personnel and funding. It could be argued
that if state and federal executives required that SWAT units be
staffed by full time officers our nation’s police forces must grow
dramatically. This is not the case. Although the statistics on this
question are somewhat unclear, some police forces and agencies
already have full time SWAT officers. 266 Additionally, officers who
were conducting part-time SWAT duties would now be available to
either be a full-time SWAT officer or full-time police officer
performing traditional law enforcement duties. This division
would alleviate some of the personnel pressure a full-time
consolidated SWAT organization would create. Finally, funding for
SWAT units or assets that have little justification, like the
Department of Agriculture’s, could be redirected and more
efficiently used. Finally, if SWAT units are used as originally
intended, to address hostage situations, riots, and other
circumstances beyond the capabilities of normal police assets, less
officers will be needed because the number of deployments will be
reduced.
V. Conclusion
Overuse of SWAT means and methods is contrary to the
essential elements of procedural justice, just as overuse of martial
law is contrary to civil liberty. However, SWAT, like martial law,
is a necessary executive tool to protect the public under certain
limited circumstances. By interjecting prior judicial authorization
to SWAT deployments for search warrants and by requiring
magistrates to authorize specific means and methods (use of
265. Ed
Grabianowski,
How
SWAT
Teams
Work,
CULTURE,
http://people.howstuffworks.com/swat-team3.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (on
file with author).
266. SWAT STUDY, supra note 44, at 9.
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battering rams, flash bang grenades, dynamic entry), an important
check would be placed on the overuse of this law enforcement
resource. Further, by requiring a prior judicial process before the
use of such force, the public can more effectively challenge
decisions to use SWAT. In states that elect their judges,
magistrates that are too quick or lax in issuing SWAT search
warrants can be voted out of office. Further, when police elect to
use SWAT in the absence of prior judicial authorization, a civil suit
would have a greater likelihood of success. Finally, by
consolidating SWAT resources and chains of command, SWAT can
be returned to its proper use, in circumstances where standard
police resources are inadequate.

